The Theory Of Psychology And Psychology - 2418 Words

Behaviorism Cassie E Blocker Lonestar Community College Author Note This paper was prepared for Psychology 2301 taught by Dr. Anne Perucca Introduction It’s a common misconception that you need to be in a research lab or academic setting to witness elements of psychology in action. The reality is that psychological theories are used almost constantly in our daily lives. Many of these theories are, in fact, a fundamental part of our daily interactions with one’s self and with others. A great example of â€Å"everyday psychology† is demonstrated in the theory of behaviorism; from a teacher using rewards and incentives to finish homework, to a mother using cookies to convince her child to finish his or her vegetables. Behaviorism itself is the study of all observable behaviors we exhibit. More importantly, behaviorism explores ways to influence these behaviors using positive and negative reinforcements. Some may consider this as a form of manipulation, but it’s important to remember that manipulation isn’t always a bad thing! The study of behaviorism has, in many ways, shaped what we know about the human condition, and also raised many questions. Study of behavior is an almost instinctual part of the human psyche. Learning how people behave and why, helps us learn what motivates us. Early behaviorists learned that they could study the overt behaviors of animals instead of trying to ask them questions to see what they were thinking (a highly unproductiveShow MoreRelatedPsychology : Theory Of Psychology1637 Words   |  7 PagesIntroduction to Psychology Module 1. Explain how a person committed to each of the following contemporary perspectives would explain human aggression. a. Psychodynamic: A person committed to psychodynamics would see that human functions are based on the interaction of drives and forces within the unconscious mind of a person. This influences different structures of the personality of the person as well. In addition, a person that is committed to psychodynamics would believe that the fundamentalRead MoreThe Theory Of Psychology And Psychology859 Words   |  4 PagesThroughout long history of psychology, there are many brilliant and remarkable psychologists who grew psychology longing as 21st century, today. They have contributed many theories, ideas, and experiments that made study of human mind and behavior much more noble and interesting. As psychology grow older and older, there are many different types of branches that were created, such as psychoanalysis, behavior, cognitive, evolutionary, and developmental. Each branches have changed way society worksRead MoreThe Psychology Theory Of Psychology Essay1458 Words   |  6 Pag esWhen we think about psychology, it is normally thought about the study of the brain, the conscious and unconscious mind. However, there are many different divisions within the psychology field that focus on specific areas that introduce different theories. One of the divisions is the theory of Behaviorism. This theory was developed by John B. Watson and B.F Skinner. The theory implies that environmental stimulus can affect someone’s behavior. This behavioral psychology focuses on how a humans orRead MoreThe Theory Of Psychology And Psychology947 Words   |  4 Pages Before psychology consolidated it self as the school of thought we have come to know today, it went through a number of theoretical adjustments. Freud and Watson became pioneers of two different approaches. Psychodynamics and Behaviorism could be argued to be two of the most pivotal influences on psychology. To really grasp their value we have to understand their individual philosophical influences, founders and their theories. Both have expanded the growth of psychology as a science, but withRead MorePsychology And The Theory Of Psychology999 Words   |  4 Pages Psychology in a continuously growing tree with its roots stemming from the study of reality and knowledge known as philosophy first studied by ancient Greece (Wiley 8). It can be defined as the study of behaviours and mental processes in which behaviours are observable activities, and mental processes include all internal thoughts and emotions. Psychologists often have one (or more) of four goals in mind when they co nduct research: describing, explaining, predicting, or controlling (5-6). Read MoreThe Theory Of Psychology And Psychology1819 Words   |  8 PagesHistorically psychology has tried to establish a unified approach using structuralism. Structuralism explores the structure of the human mind by analysing consciousness into component parts. Psychologists later excluded structuralism in exchange towards functionalism (Magnavita, 2005). Psychology is the scientific study of behaviour and the mind. While behaviour can be directly observed for example through actions and responses, the mind cannot directly be seen for example thoughts. Psychology trustsRead MoreThe Theory Of Psychology And Psychology3461 Words   |  14 Pagesopen fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history.† — Charles Darwin While psychology of today follows the discipline’s rich and varied history, the origins of psychology show incomparable differences from the modern understanding of the field. From the beginning, psychology has been tested and bombarded with a tremendousRead MoreThe Theories Of Psychology And Psychology1844 Words   |  8 PagesPsychology is the study of the human mind, it is very complex and it is the source of all thoughts and behaviors. Psychologists study the cognitive, emotional, and social processes by observing, interpreting, and recording how individuals relate to one another and their environments. They take human behavior as data for testing their theories about how the mind works and use human behavior as a clue to the workings of the mind. Everything a person does, think, feel and say is determined by the functioningRead MoreThe Theory Of Psychology And Psychology1599 Words   |  7 PagesPsychology first started in 1879 by Wilhelm Wundt who founded the first lab oratory which specialized in psychology at the University of Leipzig in Germany. Wundt used controlled experiments to investigate the mind by using a method called introspection which examined an individual’s mental state to gain an understanding of how our mind works. This approach became known as Structuralism, deals with the study of the conscious mind, with the idea that the conscious mind can be broken down into basicRead MorePsychology Theories And Theories Of Psychology984 Words   |  4 PagesThere are many theories and beliefs about where psychopathology originates from, that is the beauty of psychology. We can have different views that match or mismatch-specific clients and the services they are seeking, but each approach is beneficial one way or the other. To me, psychopathology originates from our thoughts. The causes of human suffering are problematic thoughts or beliefs. Our thoughts play such an important role in our behaviors and actions. If we have a problem atic thought, this

The Poem America By William Cullen - 1423 Words

Bryant, William Cullen. â€Å"America.† PoemHunter.com, www.poemhunter.com/poems/america/page-1/22259747/. The poem â€Å"America† is William Cullen Bryant’s nationalistic devotion and love for his motherland, which he portrays with vivid description and figurative language. In this poem, Bryant praises America as the â€Å"mother of a mighty race,† claiming that free Americans are now going to create major impact on the world with their new independence. Furthermore, he says that America does not know how the people of her country are devoted to her and will give up their own lives if they had to fight a foe for her. Bryant also exemplifies how foreign countries make fun of America by calling it a fairly new and underdeveloped country. To which he†¦show more content†¦He is educated by his master’s wife and learns an important lesson that changes his viewpoint of slavery: slavery exists not because the masters are better than their slaves, but because they keep their slaves ignorant. This epiphany develops Douglass’ fight for freedom. The next time his master tries to whip him, he fights back, deciding that he would rather be dead than be treated like a slave, marking an important change in history. Throughout his life, Frederick Douglass was passed around to different masters, but never gave up his strive for freedom. Towards the end of the book, he successfully escapes and managed to reach New York, but even after this, he realizes that even if he is free, his journey is not over and he is to continue his struggle until slavery is abolished. He writes his narrative as an active abolitionist to teach all aspects of the future American generation to follow his steps. Douglass, Frederick. â€Å"What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?† Teaching American History, Teaching American History, teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/what-to-the-slave-is-the-fourth-of-july/. Another brilliant work by Frederick Douglass, â€Å"What to the Slave is the fourth of July?† is a speech that addresses and speaks to the frustration caused by the distinction created between the idealistic and real United States. This clear contrast is represented in his organization of his speech––one that starts withShow MoreRelatedThe Prairies Essay example686 Words   |  3 PagesMany images of nature in the writing at this time, as well as writers, encompass sympathetic interests in the past. One particular piece, William Cullen Bryants The Prairies captures an strong sympathetic look to the past. In his poem The Prairies, William Cullen Bryants exhibits a sympathetic interest in the past throughout this work. Bryant begins his poem by saying, These are the Gardens of the Desert, these/ The Unshorn fields, boundless and beautiful, / And fresh as the young earth, errRead MoreThe Great And Famous Poets Of History And Names1894 Words   |  8 Pagesremembrance any of the great and famous poems known to man and titles such as The Iliad, â€Å"The Raven†, and â€Å"Carpe Diem† might be recalled and admired. Very seldom in our personal lists of famed or admired poets does the name William Cullen Bryant make an appearance, and works of his such as â€Å"Thanatopsis† are all but familiar to the average American citizen. Despite this rather unfortunate modern reality, a very longstanding truth remains firm about the late William Cullen Bryant; He was at some point in hisRead More`` Contemplations `` By Anne Bradstreet Essay1462 Words   |  6 Pagesoften may ble ed into another. 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This is a beautiful poem because with the characteristic of celebration of beauty and mystery of nature it shows how beautiful nature is and if someday someoneRead MoreLiterary Analysis Of Freedom Of Speech1325 Words   |  6 Pagesthe press were what the country was built on, and are still exercised every day in America. American citizens, since the times of the British Colonies, were so outspoken that they founded a nation on the freedom to believe whatever you want to believe. Most Americans still exhibit this characteristic today. As shown in Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God by the Reverend Jonathan Edwards, â€Å"Thanatopsis† by William Cullen Bryant, and What is an American? by J. Hector St. John Creve coeur, Americans areRead MoreThe American Dream Analysis827 Words   |  4 Pagesthe better. One author, William Bryant Cullen, emphasized how America is a refuge for â€Å"Earth’s trodden down and opprest† peoples, including the â€Å"hunted head† and the â€Å"starved laborer.† This phrase from the patriotic poem indicates that the poor peoples of Europe, including fugitives or debtors –– the hunted heads –– and the jobless common folk whose competitions for wages increase with the population boom in the Old World –– the starved laborer –– are all welcome in America. He presents a hopefulRead MoreThe Fireside Poets Were Popular At A Time When The United States1382 Words   |  6 Pagespoets were one of the first groups to take their views to a more real-world level, in founding magazines such as the Atlantic Monthly (John Greenleaf Whittier), supporting public projects such as Central Park and th e Metropolitan Museum of Art (William Cullen Bryant), and even founding a political party and running for Congress (John Greenleaf Whittier). The lead-up to the Civil War was also weighing on the minds of many, which prompted Henry Wadsworth Longfellow to write â€Å"Paul Revere’s Ride†, anRead MoreEarly American Literature Essay1511 Words   |  7 Pages It quickly became evident that the search for a native literature became a national obsession. Then with the triumph of American independence, many at the time saw this as a divine sign that America and her people were destined for greatness. Greatness came with a strong nation and thousands of poems and stories that still shape our nation. The recent revolution greatly expressed the heart of the American people. However, it would take another fifty years of development throughout AmericanRead MoreThe Fire Side Poets from the Romantic Period of Literature Appreciate Nature586 Words   |  3 Pageswhere people were trying to find a distinctive voice. The Romantic period included letters, poems, essays, books, and art. Most of the authors focused on feelings, which is why its called the â€Å"Romantic† period. The authors can be put into four different groups, The fire side poets, The Transcendentalist, American Gothic, and The Early Romantics. The fire side authors had an appreciation for nature. Poems were read aloud around camp fires by many different families. This is how they got the nameRead MoreThe Harlem Renaissance and Slave Narratives1431 Words   |  6 Pagesboth the Harlem Renaissance writers and slave narratives showed the will for a better life and hope for the future, which they hoped to make better. Writers like Langston Hughes who were from the Harlem renaissance and were educated writers wrote poems like â€Å"I, Too† which talks about how the black man shall one day sit on the dinner table with the white folks, even though they have mistreated him. An example of this is â€Å"Tomorrow, I’ll be at the table when company comes, nobody’ll dare say to me eat

Spinoza Feat Descartes Essay Research Paper Spinoza free essay sample

Spinoza Feat. Descartes Essay, Research Paper Spinoza at first worked in the model of the Cartesian doctrine, publication in 1663 a book entitled Principles of the Philosophy of Ren? Descartes. Another early work, the posthumously published Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, contains subjects that were cardinal to Descartes? probe of cognition. It besides contains intimations of the metaphysics unfolded in the posthumously published Ethical motives, the finishing touch of Spinoza # 8217 ; s philosophical calling. In the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza ( like Descartes ) was concerned with the betterment of human cognition, which requires that we be able to separate the true from the false in a dependable manner. Rather than looking for some kind of farther thought or belongings as the standard of truth, he claimed that truth radiances away on its ain: the standard of the true thought is the true thought itself. A method of seeking truths is most perfect when it begins with the thought of a most perfect being. The truth of the thought lies in the kernel it expresses. The thought of a perfect being is a true thought, matching to something bing, because the kernel of a perfect being implies its being. Further, whatever follows from the thought of such a being is besides true. Thus the best method will bring forth an order of thoughts, fluxing from the thought of a perfect being. To this conceptional order corresponds an order of bing things. Spinoza? s system can be understood in footings of its similarities and differences to the system of Descartes ( Principles I, 51ff ) . Descartes? system will hence be recapitulated. The peculiar object of comparing is his ontology ( systematic numbering of what exists ) . The objects of Descartes? ontology are substances. The lone substance decently alleged, that is, the lone being that does non depend on anything else for its being, is God. God # 8217 ; s being is contained in his kernel, so there is no demand for anything but the kernel to see God # 8217 ; s being. Substances in a comparative sense are God # 8217 ; s creative activities, which depend merely on God # 8217 ; s will to be. In peculiar, substances improperly alleged do non depend on one another for their being. Each substance has a chief property, which makes it the sort of thing that it is. God has the property of thought ( which includes apprehension and willing ) . Some created substances ( worlds and angels ) besides have the property of thought, while others ( physical objects and non-human animate beings ) have the property of extension. Descartes believed that thought and extension are reciprocally sole: no substance can hold both properties. Therefore I myself am a thought substance and my organic structure is an drawn-out substance. The complex of the two ( the # 8220 ; rational animate being # 8221 ; ) is non a substance, on Descartes? position, though it was on the position of Aristotle. Created substances, harmonizing to Descartes, of the same sort are differentiated from one another by their manners, or the ways in which they have their properties. Thinking a series of peculiar ideas, willing a series of peculiar Acts of the Apostless, all go into doing me a alone person, though I am non a alone sort of thing. Similarly, drawn-out things are differentiated by their manners: a certain size, form, province of gesture or remainder. Spinoza agreed with Descartes about substance proper ; like Descartes, he believed that the kernel of God includes God # 8217 ; s being. But he broke with Descartes by asseverating that there are no created substances. Rather, God is a being with boundlessly many properties, including thought and extension. Each of these properties is infinite in its ain sort, so there is no bound to God # 8217 ; s thought and none to extension. Difference comes in merely at the degree of manners. The single ideas that Descartes assigned to his ain head as a substance are on Spinoza? s position ideas in the head of God. Similarly, single physical things are manners of God # 8217 ; s property of extension. Spinoza? s system is supposed to follow from a few definitions and maxims. If one rejects the system ( and if Spinoza? s illations are valid ) , there must be a job with the get downing point. One of the interesting undertakings for the pupil of Spinoza is to detect the beginnings of beliefs that are found to be obnoxious. Through Propositions 1 and 2, Descartes and Spinoza are in understanding. Substance is prior to its fondnesss ( or manners ) , and two substances with different properties have nil in common. It is with Proposition 3, that what has nil in common can non causally interact, that Spinoza breaks ranks with Descartes, at what was an admitted weak point in Descartes? metaphysics. Spinoza argues for Prop. 3 on the footing of Axioms 4 and 5. The absence of a common component prevents us from understanding one sort of thing through the other. I think Descartes would hold to agree with this claim. We do non understand organic structures through heads or heads through organic structures. Actually, we would merely understand both through God # 8217 ; s head, but we have no entree to the head of God. If we do non cognize bodily events through heads, if we could neer state simply by consideration of an act of will which bodily gesture would follow it, how can we cognize that the two are connected? Merely by detecting that one does in fact follow the other, in a systematic manner. But this is non plenty to set up a causal connexion, as Spinoza recognized in the Emendation of the Intellect. In order to cognize that a connexion exists, one must detect that in the cause which brings about the consequence. Where two things have nil in common, this is impossible. The following move against Descartes? strategy is the claim in Proposition 5 that no two substances can portion an property. This means that if there is a mental substance, it is alone, and the same for drawn-out substances ( and in general any other sort of substance ) . Descartes held that there can be a existent difference between substances due to the fact that we can gestate one clearly and clearly without the other ( Principles I, 60 ) . This might be thought to work for different sorts of substance ( though Spinoza will deny this excessively ) , but how can it work for the same sort of substance? I can gestate of another head, for illustration, by gestating of its chief property, believing. But this is non plenty to separate it from any other intelligent thing. So it must be the manners of believing which separate them. Here Spinoza plays his trump card. To see a substance as a substance we must gestate it through itself ( Definition 3 ) . But so we do non gestate it through its manners, for by Definition 5, a manner is something other than the substance itself. So ( to utilize Descartes? linguistic communication against him ) no average differentiation can amount to a existent differentiation. ( One must inquire, nevertheless, whether Definition 5 has stacked the deck against Descartes! ) There remains the possibility of more than one substance, and this is the following mark. In Proposition 6, Spinoza claims that production of one substance by another ( creative activity ) is non possible. The ground is the created substance would hold to be conceived through the making substance, which is contrary to the significance of # 8217 ; substance. # 8217 ; Proposition 7 establishes the relation between substance and being: the nature of substance includes its being. This is the source of the ontological statement, though it differs in signifier from both Anselm? s and Descartes? versions. The claim here is that because nil else can bring forth substance, substance is self-generated, and therefore that it exists from its really nature. But this is a questionable statement, for it does non see the inquiry why substance has to be produced at all. We have reached the point where Spinoza claims to hold shown that substance exists needfully, but it is still an unfastened inquiry how many substances there are. Spinoza # 8217 ; s reply will be that there is merely one, but to get at this decision, he had to do some farther claims about properties. The first claim is that substances are infinite, in the sense that they are non limited by anything of their ain sort. A thought substance is the lone thought substance, and hence it is non limited by any other thought substance. The same holds for drawn-out substance. There is nil greater than the universe ( whole extended existence ) , since there is merely one extended thing: the universe itself. After demoing the limitless character of each property singly, Spinoza introduces the impression of grades of world, matching to figure of properties. A substance may hold more than one property, since each property is conceived through itself. A maximum substance ( identified with God ) would hold boundlessly many properties, each one of which is infinite. It has already been argued that substance exists, but does God, maximum substance, be? Spinoza has several cogent evidences that a maximum substance exists, but possibly the most of import one is from the mere possibility of a maximum substance. Its nature does non affect a contradiction, so its being is possible. And if some other thing were able to forestall its being, that thing would restrict the maximum substance. But by definition each property is limitless, so no thing of the same property can forestall the being of maximum substance. Further, there can be no struggle among the different properties, since they have nil in common. So from the mere possibility of a maximum substance, the decision is drawn that it must be. Furthermore, there is merely one maximum substance. This is non surprising, given the statement for its being. A maximum substance has all the properties that can be had, so that if there were another one, it would hold to portion in these properties, which would be a restriction and contrary to the nature of the maximum substance. Maximal substance is besides indivisible. This claim is really of import to Spinoza, given his designation of maximum substance with God. The properties are non parts of substance, and so there is no division of substance in that which constitutes its kernel. It is true that the properties themselves may be in a manner that allows division. If thought is an property of substance, there may be single ideas which are distinguishable from one another. And if extension is an property of substance, there may be extended things ( e.g. the blocks doing up the wall of a tower ) which are distinguishable and so are themselves divisible. But the divisibility of the manners of substance do non intend that substance itself is divisible. For substance is conceived through itself, non through its manners or mannerisms. This differentiation is perfectly critical to Spinoza? s idea: it is what prevents him from falling into the position that world is homogeneous. Spinoza was a monist, in that he held that merely one thing ( maximum substance or God ) is ultimately existent, but he wanted to keep at the same clip that the visual aspect of plurality is non an semblance. To make so, he gave a topographic point to plurality at the degree of manners. At this point we need to see the specific inquiry of whether God can be extended. Spinoza counted as his oppositions those philosophers who argued that God is immaterial. He granted that it would be incorrect to believe of God as holding a organic structure like a human being, as do the Gods of the ancient Greeks and Romans. This would be to do God finite. But this does non govern out the possibility that the infinite sweep of drawn-out nature is the # 8220 ; organic structure # 8221 ; of God. But possibly the very nature of drawn-out things precludes God from being extended. The statement is that nil extended can be infinite, and so extension is non suited to be an property of God. If there were infinite extension, it is claimed, paradoxes would originate ( Galileo, for one, was cognizant of such paradoxes ) . For illustration, take any unit of measuring of a finite length, say an inch. Then an infinite length would dwell of boundlessly many inches. On the other manus, it would besides hold boundlessly many pess, and therefore be 12 times larger! Modern philosophers ( following the nineteenth-century mathematician Cantor ) would deny that the decision follows from the premises. They maintain that since there is a one-to-one correspondence between pess and inches, the figure of pess and the figure of inches is the same. Spinoza # 8217 ; s attack was rather different. He maintained that all the statement establishes is that # 8220 ; infinite measure is non mensurable and can non be made up of finite parts # 8221 ; ( Ethical motives, Part I, Proposition 15, Scholium ) . But in that instance, what about the parts we perceived drawn-out objects to hold? Spinoza once more draws a differentiation between how we view extension abstractly through the imaginativeness ( whence they have parts ) and through the mind ( as unitary substance ) . This recalls the differentiation made earlier, that # 8220 ; affair is everyplace the same, and there are no distinguishable parts in it except in so far as we conceive affair as modified in assorted ways. Then its parts are distinguishable, non truly but merely modally # 8221 ; ( ( Ethical motives, Part I, Proposition 15, Scholium ) . Spinoza considered a figure of other statements on this subject, but we will go through over them in the involvements of clip. The following subject is Spinoza # 8217 ; s claim that everything that is or can be conceived, is in God. This is truly merely an amplification of his place that God is maximum substance. Whatever exists either is God or a manner of one of God # 8217 ; s properties. As mentioned above, Spinoza denies that there is a creative activity of other things. The impression that God has an mind which allows the construct of an uncreated universe, and a will which creates the universe is denounced by Spinoza as anthropomorphous. God as rational Godhead is every bit much a myth as Jupiter or Zeus. At the same clip, Spinoza held that God is the cause of all things. Obviously this is possible merely on a really specific apprehension of the impression of a cause. In the primary sense, something is a cause when its nature is responsible from the being of something. Therefore because everything follows from the nature of God, God is the cause of all things ( including God, for substance is self-caused ) . Furthermore, God causes all things that are in the range of the Godhead mind, since an infinite figure of things flow from an infinite substance. Subsequently, at Proposition 35, Spinoza claims that whatever is in God # 8217 ; s power needfully exists. Since God is a cause in the sense that what exists follows from God # 8217 ; s kernel, God can be said to be a free cause. Freedom here is understood in the sense of a deficiency of external restraint. God is free because there is nil to interfere with the flowering of the Divine kernel. This impression of freedom does non affect any impression of will or pick ; so, Spinoza denies that God has a # 8220 ; will # 8221 ; or makes picks. To impute tungsten ailment and pick to God is anthropomorphous, a projection of ( alleged ) human features onto the Godhead being. In fact, will is merely a manner, non an property of substance. In Part II, Spinoza maintains that there is nil more to will than single Acts of the Apostless of will. Thus will is non a â€Å"faculty† of God ( and this holds for â€Å"intellect† every bit good ) . It might be objected that without pick, God is non free. Because they follow needfully from God # 8217 ; s kernel, things can non be otherwise than what they are, and this is a restriction of God # 8217 ; s power. Spinoza turns the tabular arraies on this expostulation, saying that if things were otherwise than what they are, they would hold to be the merchandise of a God with a different nature, in which instance two Gods would be possible, and God would non be the maximum substance. In the succeeding propositions, Spinoza discusses a figure of facets of the causality of God. What is most of import is a differentiation between two ways in which God is a cause. From the kernel of God, some things are said by Spinoza to follow straight. In this sense, God is a # 8220 ; proximate # 8221 ; cause. But with finite bing things, kernels are non sufficient for being. The kernel of an single homo being, Peter, is non such that Peter # 8217 ; s being follows from it needfully. Rather, the being of finite things has as its cause the being of other finite things. However, since all things are in God, God must be considered their cause. In general, there are two ways of thought of God, as a being conceived through itself and as a being conceived through its fondnesss. Considered in the first sense, God is free ( in the sense noted above ) . But in the kingdom of finite things, which are lone fondnesss of God, there is merely necessity. Each thing exists as it does entirely by virtuousness of some cause which necessitates it. Nothing can find itself to action. Finite being and action is determined by anterior causes, to eternity. There is no first cause of finite things. If it is supposed that there is a first cause, so it would hold to be of the same sort as what it causes. Then it would be limited by that thing and therefore finite. But every finite thing has a cause. Thingss must be as they are, so there is no eventuality in the universe. A contingent being or action would be one that neither must happen of necessity nor can non happen of necessity. But everything is either necessary or impossible. What we think is contingent ( e.g. that I was born at the exact minute that I was ) truly depends on our ignorance of the concatenation of causes ( Corollary to Prop. 23, Pt. II ) . Part I of the Ethics concludes with a singular treatment of the beginning of the common manner in which God is conceived. Belief in God is the consequence of a combination of an ignorance of causes and a desire to acquire one # 8217 ; s manner. When we do non cognize the cause of the happening of a favorable event, we deem it a mark of God # 8217 ; s favouring of us. In general, events are understood as dependant on God # 8217 ; s terminals, and systems of worship are built up, designed to derive God # 8217 ; s favor. The existence is understood in footings of concluding causes ( for illustration, as in Aristotle # 8217 ; s doctrine ) . Furthermore, since catastrophe sometimes befalls the pious and fortune sometimes favours the impious, God # 8217 ; s existent program for the existence is deemed cryptic. On Spinoza # 8217 ; s position, there are no concluding causes: the existence is utterly indifferent to the lucks of any single. There is no differentiation between good and bad, right or incorrect, except every bit comparative to the involvements of the persons who use those labels. Since these involvements are tied to the favor of God, people call # 8220 ; good # 8221 ; that which is consistent with their construct of God and # 8220 ; bad # 8221 ; that which is non. The same applies to evaluative constructs such as order and upset, beautiful and ugly. We can neer specify the flawlessness of God utilizing these comparative constructs. Merely an rational apprehension of God # 8217 ; s nature as a maximum substance adequately characterizes God # 8217 ; s flawlessness. In Part II of the Ethical motives, Spinoza turns from the general nature of God to the two particular properties which we human existences understand: idea and extension. We know through experience that we think and that we have organic structures, but we are non familiar with any manner of any other property of God. The relation between idea and extension in the human being is considered in two ways. The metaphysical relation between the two is explored in the earlier propositions of Part II. In the ulterior 1s, the attending displacements to the manner in which thought represents drawn-out things, and eventually, how it represents things in general. What we call a human being consists of an drawn-out organic structure and a series of thoughts of the organic structure ( the homo head ) . The organic structure is capable to the causal Torahs of the physical universe, as is the head, which is determined by old thoughts, with both causal ironss paralleling each other. In fact, Spinoza claims by and large that the order and connexion of drawn-out things is the same as the order and connexion of thoughts. Since the thesis of correspondence dominates Part II, its cogent evidence deserves a close expression. Modes of idea are thoughts, which have a # 8220 ; formal world, # 8221 ; which is their very being. But thoughts have every bit good content, or # 8220 ; nonsubjective reality. # 8221 ; Because the formal world of thoughts is embedded in a necessary concatenation of causes, its nonsubjective world is determined by that concatenation every bit good. For Spinoza had set out as Axiom 4 of Part I that # 8220 ; The cognition of an consequence depends on, and involves, the cognition of the cause. # 8221 ; From this he infers that the content of a given thought follows from the content of the thought which caused the being of that thought. In the Scholium to Proposition 8, Spinoza put the affair another manner: the thought and its content ( an extended organic structure ) are two manners of the being of the same thing. We may now contrast Spinoza? s position with Descartes? . First, whereas Descartes claimed that head and organic structure are independent substances, Spinoza claimed that both are manners of a individual substance, which is both believing and extended. ( This position is sometimes called # 8220 ; impersonal monism. # 8221 ; ) Furthermore, Descartes claimed that he could gestate himself without a organic structure, but for Spinoza, the head is the thought of the organic structure, and therefore impossible without it. Finally, Descartes held that the head can impact the organic structure freely, and the organic structure can impact the head against its will: both can move independently of the other. Spinoza proposed alternatively a # 8220 ; psycho-physical correspondence, # 8221 ; harmonizing to which all Acts of the Apostless of both head and organic structure unfold in lock-step with each other. More by and large, to every drawn-out thing there corresponds an thought of that thing. The drawn-out existence for Spinoza is animate. What distinguishes the thought consisting the human head from other thoughts is the complexness of the human organic structure of which it is the thought. The representation of this organic structure is every bit complex to the extent feature of human idea. There follows a treatise on organic structures in general, which is used to explicate how the human organic structure operates, which in bend explains the thoughts which we get from experience. After puting out the general impressions of gesture and remainder, Spinoza offered up a impression of the signifier of a organic structure, which is an # 8220 ; unvarying relation of motion # 8221 ; among the parts doing up the organic structure. The material components of a organic structure may alter while the signifier remains the same. It was of import for Spinoza to hold a manner of explicating the integrity of the human organic structure to match to the integrity of the thoughts which make up the human head. To account for the distinctive feature of human experience that our thoughts represent more than simply the provinces of our ain organic structures, Spinoza concocted a physiology of bodily parts. The cardinal elements are # 8220 ; soft # 8221 ; parts which can alter when the human organic structure is acted upon by another organic structure. The continuity of their changed province histories for the production of thoughts as if the organic structure were still at that place, therefore explicating how memory and imaginativeness are possible. Besides explained is the manner in which people normally understand nature. This # 8220 ; first sort of cognition # 8221 ; ( which is truly sentiment instead than genuinely cognition ) , comes from insouciant experience. It is described as # 8220 ; external, causeless, # 8221 ; ensuing from the # 8220 ; run of circumstance. # 8221 ; Exposure to a form of events A-B reinforces the feelings made on us, ensuing in the strengthening of the images which follow when A occurs once more. In this manner, we make causal judgements which are non truly justified because there is no penetration into how B comes from A. ( David Hume would claim in the Eighteenth Century that this is the lone manner causal judgements can be made, so that none are justified! ) It besides leads to a false philosophy of universals. Peoples believe that they know the kernel of a thing ( say a human being ) based on what is common in their experience. Whether a human being is called a rational animate being, a unfeathered two-legged animate being or a riant animate being depends wholly on the associations made with cases of worlds we have encountered. Similarly, common linguistic communication is based on association. When I hear the word # 8216 ; apple, # 8217 ; there comes to mind an image of a baseball sized fruit with a glistening tegument, lush flesh, etc. There is no ground this association takes topographic point other than my experience in holding such a thing pointed out to me when I hear the word. Spinoza maintained that a great trade of the confusion of human thought stems from a failure to acknowledge the flightiness of linguistic communication which is based on association entirely. With all this in head, Spinoza states that experience outputs unequal thoughts ( # 8221 ; images # 8221 ; ) of other organic structures, our ain organic structures, and our ain heads. With regard to organic structures, the job is that our thoughts of them pertain to their signifier, and non their stuff components. So these thoughts will ever be unequal. ( We have even more unequal thoughts of other organic structures, since we know them merely through the effects on our ain organic structures. ) And since the head is the thought of the organic structure, the insufficiency of the thought of the organic structure spills over to the thought of the thought of the organic structure ( i.e. , the thought of the head ) . What is common to knowledge of the first sort is that it is based on imaginativeness, which in bend comes from experience. What we get in imaginativeness is # 8220 ; dense pictures. # 8221 ; The head has other thoughts, nevertheless, which result from its activity. These thoughts are conceived, non imagined, and it is in them that true cognition lies. # 8220 ; Knowledge # 8221 ; of the first sort is non knowledge proper, but merely sentiment. A higher signifier of cognition ( # 8221 ; cognition of the 2nd sort # 8221 ; ) is that affecting common impressions and equal thoughts of the belongingss of things. Ideas of gesture and remainder are common to all extended organic structure. ( Contrast this with the more restricted thought of a human being, which is a cosmopolitan derived from single experience. ) So Torahs of natural philosophies such as the preservation jurisprudence enunciated in the treatise on organic structure would be known in this manner. The highest signifier of cognition is intuitive. We gain # 8220 ; cognition of the 3rd sort, # 8221 ; simply by contemplating the thoughts involved. The thoughts are those of the properties of God and the kernels of things. Part I of the Ethics exhibits this sort of cognition. Spinoza posed a inquiry considered at length by Descartes: how he could separate between sentiment and cognition. Is at that place a standard to divide the two? In the instance of images, one can hold false thoughts without being able to state that they are false. We think that they are true when we lack a ground to believe otherwise. We may hold no uncertainty about its truth, but this does non amount to certainty. On the other manus, when we have a true thought, we are certain of its truth. The truth of a true thought is known through its mere ownership. Thus the true thought is the standard of truth. It is like a visible radiation which illuminates itself. When one is in ownership of a true thought, there is no inquiry about its avowal or denial. To hold a true thought is to confirm it, so in this instance, the act of the apprehension and the act of will are identical. This is so with images every bit good. Spinoza asks us to see the instance of a kid with the thought of a winged Equus caballus and no other thoughts. He claims that the kid affirms the being of the Equus caballus merely through the ownership of the thought of it. Merely the presence of other thoughts excepting the being of the Equus caballus would give rise to uncertainty. In general, the apprehension of an thought is indistinguishable to its avowal or denial. Individual thoughts are nil more or less than single Acts of the Apostless of will. ( Note that in Part II, Spinoza restricts himself to confirming and denying as Acts of the Apostless of will, reserving until later a treatment of other wills, such as pursuing and avoidance. ) Further, there is nil over and above single Acts of the Apostless, no # 8220 ; module # 8221 ; of apprehension or willing, since the head itself is merely a manner of thought. So the will and the mind are the same thing. The individuality of will and intellect undermines Descartes? contention that will is free. One footing for this contention is the claim that one is at autonomy to doubt the truth of any thought whatsoever ( the undertaking of the First Meditation ) . Spinoza counters that this autonomy is illusive. One # 8217 ; s suspension of judgement is a necessary effect of the acknowledgment that there are grounds that an thought is non true. And if the thought is true, its ownership is equivalent to its avowal. Spinoza discussed other Cartesian statements for free will, but here merely one other one will be noted. Descartes had instead tepidly embraced the # 8220 ; autonomy of indifference, # 8221 ; which exists when and single deficiencies any ground tending him or her toward one option instead than another. If an single deficiencies freedom to move in an arbitrary mode, so he or she will be in the same place as an buttocks who starved to decease when faced with a pick between two type of provender, which he likes every bit good. Spinoza # 8217 ; s response is that in the instance where there is no tending penchant, the person would non so act like a rational homo being. Any hungering to decease because he could non make up ones mind which eating house he liked best would be acting irrationally, like a kid, person insane, or even an buttocks. ( In equity to Descartes, it should be noted that he considered indifference to be the lowest signifier of autonomy. ) At the terminal of Part II, Spinoza summed up the advantages of populating one # 8217 ; s life harmonizing to the sort of cognition described in the Ethics. In general, one has a proper fear for God, a regard for other people, and a neglect for what is beyond one # 8217 ; s power. But he ends paradoxically, saying that citizens should be governed and led # 8220 ; so as to make freely what is best # 8221 ; ( Ethical motives, Part II, Scholium to Proposition 49 ) . It is merely in a really rare sense that people are able to move freely, and merely a comparative sense in which they may make what is best. [ c2p ]

None_provided Essays (284 words) - Stith, Job Interview,

None_provided This book is an in-depth look at contemporary American popular music and the kind of musicianship that is appropriate to it. Stith attempts to explain dynamics of rock musicians by studying how the skills, ideas, and human identities associated with this population manage to be created and transmitted in the context of industrialized culture. In addition, he is trying to examine how musicians begin to take on and are characterized by that identity. Stith is interested with this phenomenon because these people were not ?successful? or had not received a record contract, yet their identities remained intact. Stith gathered his data through six years of sporadic field study throughout Colorado, Illinois, Washington, California, Missouri, and southern France. He used both observational and interview methods in his study, however, it was participant observation that was used as a primary data-gathering technique. He presented himself as a musician and indicated in some form that he was interested in forming a group. At times he presented himself as a performer, other times as a ?role organizer?, yet never hiding the fact that he was involved in social research. His secondary data-gathering technique was that he conducted several informal interviews with several members of these rock groups that he was associated with. These interviews were conducted during ?down-times?, usually times where the group was hanging out, eating, traveling, etcetera. The size of the sample Stith studied and the ways in which the data-gathering techniques were administered differed from group to group, usually bec ause his role within the population wasn't always constant. The interview questions that were asked were hardly ever uniform, they were administered differently to suit different individuals in specific situations.